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WOMEN’S WORK IS NEVER DONE† 
CAROLYN L. WHEELER* 
INTRODUCTION 
All remedial legislation is a product of the interaction between individuals 
outside government who agitate for reform, and individuals inside government 
who draft and vote on legislation. Once enacted, statutes are often altered by 
the interpretations of enforcement agencies and courts, developed in response 
to the arguments of litigants. These interpretations in turn often prompt the 
perceived need for amendments to the initial enactment, which begins the 
cycle all over again. The legislative enactments needed to rectify the particular 
inequities facing women in the workplace have required considerable 
tinkering. This “women’s work is never done” in the sense that we have not yet 
come up with comprehensive social policies or legislative reforms that address 
women’s unique needs flowing from their (often) dual roles as family 
caregivers and workers. 
The purpose of this article is to trace the evolution and introduction of 
three major pieces of legislation addressing discrimination against women in 
the workplace and discuss how some of the differences in the impetus for their 
introduction and adoption shaped the nature of the legislation itself, and what 
consequences that may have had on subsequent enforcement agency and 
judicial interpretations of the statutes. Specifically this article will consider the 
unique histories and impacts of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, the inclusion 
of “sex” as a prohibited basis of discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978. 
 
 † The usual formulation of this proverb is “A man may work from dusk to dawn, but a 
woman’s work is never done.” Here, of course, I am using “work” to refer to the work involved in 
achieving lasting political, economic, and social reforms undertaken by organized feminists from 
the early 19th century until the present day 
* Of Counsel, Katz, Marshall & Banks, a boutique law firm specializing in representation of 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination, sexual harassment, civil rights, and whistleblower 
matters. Before joining this firm, I spent over two decades as an appellate litigator and supervisor 
for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Prior to that, I was a law clerk for three 
years to the Honorable Thomas Tang of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
J.D. University of Montana; M.A. and A.B., University of Missouri. Some portions of this article 
are expansions on materials I wrote for celebrations of the history of Title VII while working for 
the EEOC. wheeler@kmblegal.com. 
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Before turning to these enactments of the 1960s and 70s, this article first 
gives an overview of the women’s movement that culminated in passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, granting women suffrage, and the different ideas that 
supported women’s suffrage. This survey will then serve as a basis for 
examining how those ideas evolved among those who supported passage of an 
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as opposed to those who devoted their efforts 
to social reform to improve the lives of women workers. Understanding the 
roots of these ideological differences between ERA proponents and social 
reformers is useful because the same ideas about equal rights animated the 
discussions of the ERA, the EPA, Title VII, and the PDA in the 1960s and 70s. 
Understanding these ideas and arguments will also help to illuminate the limits 
of anti-discrimination laws in effecting the changes needed to address fully 
women’s unique workplace issues related to pay, harassment, and pregnancy, 
and hopefully lead to additional effective strategies to shatter the glass ceiling 
that limits women’s employment opportunities. 
BACKGROUND ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE 19TH CENTURY 
The women and men who attended the 1848 Seneca Falls convention 
endorsed a Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions, put into final form by 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, which articulated an exhaustive list of grievances: 
women were denied access to higher education, the professions, and the pulpit, 
as well as equal pay for equal work. If married, they had no property rights; 
even the wages they earned belonged legally to their husbands. Women were 
subject to a different moral code, yet legally bound to tolerate moral 
delinquencies in their husbands. Wives could be punished, and in case of 
divorce, a mother had no rights to custody of her children. As the Declaration 
concluded, in every way, man “has endeavored to destroy [woman’s] 
confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-esteem, and to make her 
willing to lead a dependent and abject life.” Above all, every woman had been 
deprived of “her inalienable right to the elective franchise.”1 There were 
eleven resolutions designed to address these inequities, and the most 
controversial, the only one not to pass unanimously, was the demand for 
suffrage.2 Despite opposition driven by the fear that the attendees at the 
convention would appear ridiculous, Stanton refused to back down from the 
demand for suffrage, saying: “To have drunkards, idiots, horse racing rum-
selling rowdies, ignorant foreigners, and silly boys fully recognized, while we 
ourselves are thrust out from all the rights that belong to citizens, is too grossly 
insulting to be longer quietly submitted to. The right is ours. We must have 
 
 1. ALICE S. ROSSI, THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 416 (1974); see 
generally id. at 415–20. 
 2. Id. at 420. 
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it.”3 Frederick Douglass, the only African American at the meeting, spoke 
eloquently in favor of suffrage, saying he could not accept the vote as a black 
man if women could not also claim that right.4 
After the Civil War, the broad women’s rights agenda narrowed to a 
primary focus on suffrage. In 1869, Stanton and Susan B. Anthony formed the 
National Woman Suffrage Association, which focused on winning the 
franchise at the federal level, while others, led by Lucy Stone, formed the 
American Woman Suffrage Association, which focused on work at the state 
level; the two groups merged in 1890, forming the National American Woman 
Suffrage Association (NAWSA), with Anthony as its first president.5 In 1913, 
Alice Paul founded the Congressional Union, which grew into the National 
Woman’s Party in 1916. Members of Paul’s organization focused specifically 
on lobbying Congress and they also engaged in militant tactics Paul had 
observed the suffragists in England use—marching, picketing the White 
House, chaining themselves to the White House fence, getting arrested, and 
then going on hunger strikes.6 
Although the central claim for women’s suffrage was the argument for 
equality, in the latter years of the struggle advocates began to argue that 
women should have the vote because they would bring a moralizing influence 
to politics, in other words that women should have the vote not because they 
were equal to men, but because they were different and in some respects better. 
Historian Aileen Kraditor describes this shift as a move from an “argument 
from justice” to an “argument from expediency,” which in later years appealed 
to nativist and frankly racist sentiments (arguing, for example that white 
women should have the vote to counter the impact of Negro male suffrage 
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment).7 Having deployed every conceivable 
argument, the fight for women’s suffrage took over 80 years and 480 battles in 
state after state before the women’s groups coalesced behind a national 
strategy of fighting for a constitutional amendment, which itself took “19 
campaigns with 19 successive Congresses.”8 
 
 3. See SALLY G. MCMILLEN, SENECA FALLS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 88–89, app. A at 238–39 (David Fischer & James McPherson eds., 2008). 
 4. See JUDITH WELLMAN, THE ROAD TO SENECA FALLS: ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND 
THE FIRST WOMEN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION 203 (Anne Firor Scott et. al. eds., 2004); see 
generally id. at 193, 195; see ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1959). 
 5. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN 
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, 189–90, 195–96, 200 (1978). 
 6. FLEXNER, supra note 4, at 282–83, 285. 
 7. See AILEEN KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920, 
39, 39 n.1, 138–71 (1965). 
 8. CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND 
POLITICS, 107 (1993) (explaining that “fifty-six campaigns of referenda to male voters; 480 
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Once women obtained the right to vote, what became of the earlier list of 
goals of the women’s rights movement? Several of the goals of the original 
Declaration of Sentiments were achieved in that women had broader 
educational and professional opportunities and many common law restrictions 
had been removed.9 As for any unfinished agenda items, for the most part they 
lost their hold on women’s imaginations. Many of the older generations of 
feminists had died; Stanton died in 1902; Anthony in 1906. Those who were 
still alive split and followed a number of diverse paths after their success in 
winning the right to vote. 
Carrie Chapman Catt, the president in 1919 of the mainstream suffrage 
organization, the NAWSA, formed the League of Women Voters (LWV), 
dedicated to educating newly enfranchised women voters about political 
issues. She remained active in this organization until her death in 1947.10 
The hardcore feminists in the National Woman’s Party (NWP) focused on 
passage of the ERA, believing that the vote had been only one step toward full 
emancipation for women, which could only be achieved through the 
eradication of all legal distinctions between men and women. These feminists 
had no patience for the ground game of fighting state by state to eliminate 
specific legal barriers affecting women.11 
Other supporters of suffrage, identified by various historians as social 
feminists or social reformers,12 continued their long-standing campaigns for 
legislation to protect the welfare of women and children. A leading reformer in 
this category was Florence Kelly, who worked with the National Consumers’ 
League (NCL), formed in 1898.13 Labor reform had a long history of efforts to 
regulate working conditions, and those efforts were not gender-specific. One 
central goal of workers from the 1820s on was to put limits on the workday, 
and by the 1870s thirteen states had passed ten-hour workday statues.14 These 
efforts suffered a setback when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down New 
 
campaigns to get Legislatures to submit suffrage amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to get State 
constitutional conventions to write woman suffrage into state constitutions; 277 campaigns to get 
State party conventions to include woman suffrage planks; 30 campaigns to get presidential party 
conventions to adopt woman suffrage planks in party platforms, and 19 campaigns with 19 
successive Congresses”), quoted in FLEXNER, supra note 4, at 173. 
 9. WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970 22 (1972). 
 10. Id. at 34–35. 
 11. See id. at 112–32. 
 12. Id. at 113–14; WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE 51–52 (1969). 
 13. See generally KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S WORK: 
THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE 310–315 (1995). 
 14. Ten-Hour Day Movement, ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABOR HISTORY WORLDWIDE: 
MAJOR EVENTS IN LABOR HISTORY AND THEIR IMPACT (2004), http://www.encyclopedia.com/ 
history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/ten-hour-day-movement. 
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York’s law setting a ten-hour day for bakers as violating the liberty of contract 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in Lochner v. New York.15 
Before Lochner, many reformers had worked at the state level to enact 
protective legislation for women and children, such as the Illinois Factory Act 
of 1893, which regulated sweatshop conditions, limited hours for women, and 
prohibited child labor. The eight-hour limitation for women was struck down 
by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1895 in Ritchie v. People,16 based on the same 
rationale the U.S. Supreme Court later adopted in Lochner. Undeterred, Kelley 
continued the battle on the national level when she became general secretary of 
the NCL. The NCL worked with other groups, such as the Women’s Trade 
Union League (WTUL), to win other such reforms and succeeded in enacting 
hours limits and restrictions on night work for women in eighteen states. These 
reformers saw legislation protecting women and children as a vehicle, or 
wedge, for winning reforms that would ultimately benefit men as well. 
Oregon’s ten-hour law for women workers was addressed in Muller v. 
Oregon,17 and the Court accepted that the state’s interest in protecting the 
health of mothers superseded the freedom of contract doctrine. The Court said 
that “history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon 
man,” and that a woman, like a child, “has been looked upon in the courts as 
needing especial care” and “[s]he is properly placed in a class by herself, and 
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained.”18 After Muller, the 
NCL relied on its rationale in fights for minimum-wage laws in a number of 
states, and state courts upheld those wage laws as well as the protective laws 
setting hours limits and night work bans.19 The NCL, true to its initial concept, 
then used Muller to argue for a maximum hours law for all workers in Bunting 
v. Oregon,20 in which the Court upheld a ten-hour day for both men and 
women. 
Conflicts between advocates of the ERA and protective legislation raged 
throughout the 1920s. In essence, the two groups had diametrically opposite 
conceptions of equality. The NWP and ERA proponents saw protective 
legislation as discriminatory and as overtly harming women’s economic 
opportunities because such laws effectively restricted women’s access to 
better-paying jobs and shifts, reinforcing their being stuck in lower-paying sex-
segregated jobs. ERA proponents advocated equal access to all jobs on equal 
 
 15. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 16. See generally Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895). 
 17. See generally Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 18. Id. at 421–22. 
 19. WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, FEMINISM IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 152 (1989). 
 20. See generally Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
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terms for all.21 The social reformers, or protectionists, based their arguments 
on women’s differences from men, arguing that women’s unique childbearing 
and childrearing responsibilities necessitated special treatment in the 
workplace.22 Reformers had supported suffrage primarily on the ground that 
women needed the vote to be able to effectuate other needed reforms. For 
example, Kelley told a congressional committee in 1910 of a failure to get 
New York to appropriate money for factory inspections and said that the 
mayor of New York told her she should stop wasting her time because she had 
“not a voter in [her] constituency” and both she and the legislators knew that.23 
But once women won the vote, these reformers were ready to attend to their 
primary goals. 
The ERA proponents, such as Alice Paul, were initially willing to include 
exemptions from the ERA that would save protective legislation. In the end 
however, because many in the NWP were opposed to protective legislation, the 
ERA did not include this language. By mid-1922 it was apparent that there was 
no reconciliation possible between the two groups, and the NCL, the LWV, 
and the WTUL all publicly announced their opposition to the “blanket equal 
rights amendment.”24 The NWP expressed its disagreement with the reformers 
by filing an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital,25 arguing against a minimum wage law for women in the District of 
Columbia.26 The Court agreed with the NWP’s position and held the law to be 
unconstitutional, restoring the Lochner freedom of contract standard in the 
wage context.27 The Court emphasized that Muller had not overruled Lochner 
because wages are different from hours.28 The Court also said that the cases 
justifying special protection for women were no longer relevant, because “[in] 
view of the great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have taken place 
since [Muller], in the contractual, political, and civil status of women, 
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that 
these differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.”29 
 
 21. Historical Overview of the National Woman’s Party, Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/collections/static/women-of-protest/images/history.pdf. 
 22. CHAFE, supra note 9, at 129. 
 23. O’NEILL, supra note 12, at 53–54. 
 24. Equal Rights Amendment and Protective Legislation, ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LABOR HISTORY WORLDWIDE: MAJOR EVENTS IN LABOR HISTORY AND THEIR IMPACT (2004), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/equal-rights 
-amendment-and-protective-legislation. 
 25. See generally Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 26. CHAFE, supra note 9, at 127. 
 27. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 560–562. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 553. 
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Later in 1923, the NWP held a conference in Seneca Falls, New York, to 
commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Declaration of Sentiments and launch 
the ERA, then introduced it in Congress in December 1923. Paul drafted the 
ERA in 1923 with the simple language, “Men and women shall have equal 
rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its 
jurisdiction.”30 The NWP was joined in its advocacy for the ERA only by the 
National Federation of Business and Professional Women’s Clubs whose 
members included professional women and skilled workers who had been 
adversely affected by protective legislation. The NWP’s biggest and most 
formidable opponent was the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) Women’s 
Bureau, but the ERA was also opposed by the NCL, the LWV, the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union, the WTUL, the National Association of 
University Women, the PTA, the YWCA, and the National Federation of 
Federal Employees.31 
Women’s Bureau director Mary Anderson was a key figure in the debate. 
She was a former factory worker and long-time proponent of labor legislation. 
At a conference in 1926 the NWP passed a resolution directing the Bureau to 
investigate and explore the effects of the protective legislation, but the final 
report, The Effects of Labor Legislation on the Employment of Women, 
constituted an overwhelming and somewhat suspect endorsement.32 This report 
defined the Bureau’s stance on the issue until 1938 when the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) was passed, extending at least some protections to 
covered workers regardless of gender.33 
Notably, by the 1960s, even proponents of this type of legislation had 
begun to see that it had its downsides in limiting women’s opportunities. But 
they did not want to repeal the laws, just update them to provide necessary 
protections without limiting work and career opportunities. For example, in 
1965, at a White House conference, Mary Keyserling, then head of the DOL 
Women’s Bureau said: “[T]hese laws were put on the books by women’s 
organizations in the interest of women . . . [and] sought to eliminate the real 
abuses which prevailed widely in industry. . . . [T]he freeing of women from 
 
 30. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017). The ERA was later reworded to say “Equality under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” It passed in Congress in 1972, 
but did not receive the necessary number of state votes for ratification; it has been reintroduced 
every year since then. Paul died in 1977 without seeing the ERA passed. 
 31. Kathryn Kish Sklar, Why Were Most Politically Active Women Opposed to the ERA in 
the 1920s?, in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE ERA 25 (Joan Hoff-Wilson 
ed., 1986). 
 32. CHAFE, supra note 9, at 119–120. 
 33. Id. 
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employment discrimination does not demand that they all have identical 
treatment.”34 
EQUAL PAY ACT 
Congress held hearings for eighteen years on the issue of pay 
discrimination against women, without producing any legislation. In 1961, 
President Kennedy ordered the establishment of the President’s Commission 
on the Status of Women to examine and recommend remedies to combat 
“prejudices and outmoded customs [that] act as barriers to the full realization 
of women’s basic rights.”35Although the Commission made many 
recommendations, the only one that led to the immediate introduction of 
legislation was a recommendation for equal pay.36 The tipping point in favor of 
this legislation after World War II was the voluminous testimony from unions, 
various women’s groups, and religious groups, and the evidence that the pay 
gap was widening: in 1955 there was a 64% differential, in 1961 it was 59%. 
In support of the proposed Equal Pay Act, Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary 
for the DOL, and head of the Women’s Bureau, noted that women were 
discouraged from entering the workforce because employers undervalued their 
work—so the pay gap leads to underutilization of good labor. As one scholar 
has observed, this argument probably was needed to persuade Congress to 
enact the legislation, but others “saw the real value of the EPA as dignitary in 
nature, sending the message that gender equality was a priority for those at the 
highest levels of government.”37 
It should be noted that Peterson subscribed to the views the Women’s 
Bureau had espoused in the 1920s, that the ERA was an unnecessary and 
pernicious proposal, and that the problems of women workers were best 
addressed through the type of specific legislative reforms the social reform 
feminists had advocated over the prior decades.38 Peterson’s twin goals upon 
being appointed by President Kennedy were to get the EPA passed, and to 
derail passage of the ERA.39 To accomplish passage of the EPA, Peterson 
organized a concerted lobbying campaign using her contacts and expertise 
from her work as a lobbyist for the AFL-CIO.40 This campaign took two years 
and included two hearings in the House and one in the Senate. The final bill 
 
 34. EEOC, White House Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity, Discrimination 
Because of Sex 22, 26 (Aug. 19-20, 1965) (panel transcript available in the EEOC Library, 
Washington, D.C.). 
 35. JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 18 (1974). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Juliene James, The Equal Pay Act in the Courts: A De Facto White-Collar Exemption, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1878–79 (2004). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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was narrower than she had hoped, and applied to only 61% of the female labor 
force, but by the time it was signed into law, members of Congress had heard a 
great deal about the problems of women workers.41 As a result, in part, of the 
origin of this piece of legislation and the prolonged debate over its terms, the 
scope of the EPA is quite narrow, its strictures are very demanding, and its 
remedies are narrowly tailored. The EPA mandates equal wages for men and 
women doing equal work except where an employer makes a differential 
payment based on a seniority system, a merit system, a system based on 
productivity of workers, or “any other factor other than sex.”42 
In its only decision construing the EPA, Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 
the Supreme Court noted that:  
Congress’ purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was 
perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of employment discrimination 
in private industry - the fact that the wage structure of “many segments of 
American industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a 
man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even 
though his duties are the same.” The solution adopted was quite simple in 
principle: to require that “equal work will be rewarded by equal wages.”43  
In Corning, the Court explained that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
that the employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes “for 
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.”44 
The Court also made clear that if a plaintiff makes that showing the burden of 
proof shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one 
of the Act’s four exceptions.45 The Court held in that case that a wage 
differential arising “simply because men would not work at the low rates paid 
women” was illegal under the EPA, because the differential was not based on a 
factor other than sex.46 In another significant interpretation of the statute, the 
Third Circuit held in Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,47 that jobs only have to be 
“substantially equal” not identical. The case involved female “selector-
packers” and male “selector-packer-stackers” who were paid more and the 
court held they were sufficiently similar to support an EPA claim.48 
 
 41. Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public 
Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 163–184 (1990-1991). 
 42. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016). 
 43. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195–196 (1974) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 44. Id. at 195–197. 
 45. Id. at 197. 
 46. Id. at 204–05. 
 47. See generally Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 48. Id. 
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How much has the EPA helped women workers? According to information 
presented by the President’s National Equal Pay Task Force in June 2013, in 
the 60s and 70s the Department of Labor (DOL) recovered $162,063,460 for 
over 269,601 workers (by 1978 when enforcement responsibility for the statute 
passed to the EEOC).49 In the 80s and 90s, the EEOC obtained a $42.4 million 
settlement from General Motors and UAW to resolve a Commissioner charge 
of a pattern and practice of race and sex discrimination.50 In 1985, the EEOC 
entered into a consent decree with Allstate on an EPA claim for sales agents, 
obtaining $5 million for 3200 women; and the EEOC’s suit against Teachers 
Insurance and Annuity Equity Fund resulted in redoing pension benefits in a 
sex neutral manner for over 800,000 women. From 2000 to 2009, the EEOC 
found cause in 829 charges and recovered $52.7 million through administrative 
enforcement.51 The EEOC also litigated against Morgan Stanley and obtained 
$54 million for sex-based discrimination in compensation, promotion, and 
other aspects of employment.52 Further, according to EEOC Chair Yang’s 
statement on January 29, 2016, the EEOC has recovered $85 million in 
monetary relief for those who have faced pay discrimination based on sex.53 
Although the oft-noted pay gap has narrowed from 59% to roughly 78% in 
2013,54 it is not immediately apparent that the EPA has contributed 
significantly to that change. 
As the Task Force Report acknowledged, a large part of the wage gap 
between men and women is attributable to occupational segregation. 44% of 
men are in occupations that are 75% male, while only 6% of women are in 
those occupations.55 These male dominated occupations include manufacturing 
salespersons, farmers and ranchers, architects, transportation supervisors, 
cutting workers, detectives and investigators, and computer programmers. In 
2010, nine of the ten most common occupations for women were majority 
female – administrative assistants, nurses, cashiers, retail salespersons, nursing 
and home health aides, waitresses, retail sales supervisors and managers, 
customer service representatives, and house cleaners.56 The explanations for 
these patterns of employment range from workers’ choices to the effects of 
 
 49. Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act: Assessing the Past, Taking Stock of the Future, 
National Equal Pay Task Force 13 (June 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/equalpay/equal_pay_task_force_progress_report_june_2013_new.pdf (hereinafter 
“Task Force Report”). 
 50. Task Force Report, supra note 50. 
 51. Task Force Report, supra note 50. 
 52. Task Force Report, supra note 50. 
 53. EEOC, Remarks of Chair Jenny R. Yang at the White House Equal Pay Event (Jan. 29, 
2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/chair-remarks-1-19-2016.cfm. 
 54. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 7. 
 55. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 6–7. 
 56. Task Force Report, supra note 50, at 24. 
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discrimination.57 Workers’ choices could explain segregation because one 
group is more “willing to accept unpleasant or dangerous work, longer hours, 
or physical strain in return for higher wages” or women could “enter 
occupations that require less investment and result in less earnings growth 
because they expect abbreviated and discontinuous labor force activity.”58 On 
the other hand, the Report notes that “historical patterns of exclusion and 
discrimination paint a more complex picture” because employers’ “outright 
refusal to hire, severe harassment of women in non-traditional jobs, or policies 
and practices that screen qualified women out of positions but are not job-
related” could explain segregation.59 Whatever the cause of occupational 
segregation, it is apparent that the EPA, with its emphasis on equal pay for 
equal work, can never adequately address this basic cause of the pay gap. 
One of several significant difficulties in obtaining relief under the EPA 
initially was that, because the EPA was an amendment to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA), the exemptions in that statute applied, so the EPA, like 
the FLSA, exempted workers employed “in a bona fide executive, 
administrative, or professional capacity.”60 Thus, while the EPA benefited 
blue-collar workers, it provided no assistance to white-collar workers. This 
exemption was lifted by the Education Amendments of 1972.61 These 1972 
Amendments are much better known as Title IX, which prohibits exclusion 
from participation in educational programs or activities on the basis of sex.62 
As one commentator has wryly noted, “Though support for this amendment 
did come from the education sector, one might rightly question why it was 
buried in an omnibus bill nine years after the EPA’s enactment, the purpose of 
which was to promote the advancement of postsecondary education through 
subsidies to institutions and ‘for other purposes.’”63Although lawyers and 
litigants educated themselves about the removal of the executive exemption 
from the EPA, and women in professional and executive positions are now 
technically able to bring claims, courts have interpreted the Act so narrowly as 
to make white-collar women’s claims almost impossible to win. “[L]ack of 
success in the courtroom presents a serious impediment to the EPA’s mandate 
of equal pay for equal work.”64 The reason the FLSA originally exempted 
administrative, professional, and executive workers was that white-collar jobs 
were considered too different, too independent, and too prestigious to be 
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measured against blue-collar counterparts.65 In other words, requiring overtime 
pay for individuals in these executive jobs would have created administrative 
difficulties because such jobs do not lend themselves to work-spreading, so 
effective regulation is difficult, and in addition it was thought that such higher 
level workers make enough money and have enough control over their hours 
that they should not be able to tax employers for overtime when they work at 
their own discretion. None of those considerations are applicable in a challenge 
to pay discrimination based on sex, but courts still seem to apply the proof 
requirements as if workers in executive and professional positions cannot be 
meaningfully compared.66 
The difficulties of establishing a prima facie case when challenging pay 
discrimination in a professional job is illustrated by the EEOC’s inability to 
challenge such discrimination against female lawyers working for the New 
York Port Authority in EEOC v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.67 
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the EEOC’s complaint because, 
although EEOC had evidence that male and female supervisory attorneys for 
the Authority were fungible under the employer’s policies and could be moved 
from one legal department to another, were subject to the same time pressures 
and deadlines, used the same legal analytical skills regardless of their practice 
area, had the same job code, had salaries determined on the same “maturity 
curve,” and were evaluated on identical criteria, that evidence was insufficient 
to show they were engaged in equal work.68 
Another difficulty for plaintiffs who might challenge unequal pay is that 
employees usually do not know what others are paid, and many employers 
specifically prohibit discussion of compensation. This reality affected Lilly 
Ledbetter when she attempted to sue Goodyear Tire under Title VII for 
underpaying her compared to men over the course of her employment. 
Goodyear based pay on performance evaluations, and Ledbetter contended that 
several of her supervisors in the past had given her poor evaluations because of 
her sex, so that by the end of her employment she was earning significantly 
less than her male colleagues. She had never known about the pay differential 
over the years. Although a jury found in her favor, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that Title VII pay claims cannot be based on discriminatory 
events that occurred before the last pay decision affecting pay during the 300 
day charge filing period. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected her claim 
because she had not challenged the intentionally discriminatory decision to pay 
her less within 300 days of the original decision.69 Justice Ginsburg found the 
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Court’s rule to be out of step with workplace realities and the remedial 
purposes of Title VII, and ended her dissenting opinion with an admonition 
that “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the Legislature 
may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”70 Although 
the Ledbetter case addressed the timing rules for claims under Title VII, the 
facts suggested a difficulty that a woman would have in asserting an EPA 
violation as well, namely that it is sometimes very difficult to know whether 
one’s compensation is based on discriminatory criteria because one does not 
know what others are paid.71 
The Court’s draconian rule led in very short order to passage of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,72 which restored the prior rules on timeliness 
of such challenges. This amendment, however, did not alleviate the underlying 
problem of being ignorant of the existence of a claim of discrimination in 
compensation. In an amendment that would address that difficulty (and others), 
members of Congress have introduced the Paycheck Fairness Act, repeatedly 
since 1997.73 This bill would amend the EPA to permit punishment of 
employers for retaliating against workers who share wage information, allow 
for punitive damages, and put the burden on employers asserting a “factor 
other than sex” defense to prove that the differential is tied to a legitimate 
business necessity. Although this bill would enhance the protections and 
remedies of the EPA, it cannot rectify the pay disparities that result from 
occupational segregation, nor does it do anything to lessen the difficulty of 
establishing a prima facie case in administrative, executive, and professional 
jobs. 
TITLE VII 
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was drafted by the Department of 
Justice at President Kennedy’s request principally as a response to compelling 
demands for racial justice and equality, from its inception the employment 
provisions in Title VII also prohibited discrimination on the bases of religion, 
sex, and national origin. The statute says it shall be unlawful for employers, 
labor unions, or employment agencies to discriminate against an individual in 
hiring, firing, compensation, or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
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because of the individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”74 The 
statute also makes it unlawful “to limit, segregate, or classify” employees or 
applicants on any of those bases in a way that deprives them of employment 
opportunities or adversely affects their status.75 The inclusion of sex as a 
prohibited basis in Title VII presents a classic example of the working of the 
democratic process in which individuals may vote for a measure for a variety 
of reasons, with consequences expected by none. 
The conventional view of how sex was added to Title VII is that a southern 
opponent of civil rights legislation introduced the “sex amendment” in hopes 
of derailing passage of the Civil Rights Act.76 While it is true that concern with 
sex discrimination had none of the immediate and visceral impact that concern 
with race discrimination had in 1963, and there was no sweeping popular 
pressure for eradicating sex discrimination—no marches, no boycotts, no 
demonstrations, and no firehoses or bombs used against proponents of equal 
rights—still it is patronizing, dismissive, and above all, inaccurate, to say the 
amendment to include sex in the bill was a fluke, a joke, or an accident. 
The fluke or accident myth arose primarily because of the absence of any 
committee report or other formal record of the legislative history.77 This 
absence is attributed to the presumed fact that the sponsor was trying to 
sabotage the entire Civil Rights Act of 1964 by engaging in a parliamentary 
ploy that happened to become law. This myth has been debunked by numerous 
scholars.78 In fact, “sex” was added to Title VII after calculated lobbying by 
women’s groups, and with the support of all but one female member of the 
House of Representatives.79 
The history of the amendment adding sex is not as sparse as it was once 
thought to be. The proposal to include sex originated with the NWP, the very 
group that had been lobbying for the ERA every year since 1923, and which 
had sought to include sex in every civil rights bill considered by Congress for 
forty years.80 The NWP asked three members of Congress to introduce an 
amendment to add sex to the Civil Rights Act: Katherine St. George of New 
York, Martha Griffiths of Michigan, and Howard Smith of Virginia, and all 
agreed to do what they could.81 Both St. George and Smith opposed passage of 
the Act, and were concerned that their sponsorship of the amendment would be 
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suspect.82 Griffiths thought Smith’s sponsorship would guarantee supporting 
votes from southern Democrats, and he ultimately agreed to propose the 
amendment.83 The NWP’s Paul was pleased with his sponsorship because he 
had been a friend and supporter of the ERA, having voted for it every year 
when it was introduced.84 Smith apparently agreed to do it because he believed 
sex discrimination was a serious problem, and that white women would be 
disadvantaged compared to black women if there were no sex amendment.85 
That appeal to white supremacy was similar to the arguments advanced by 
suffragists at the turn of the century.86 Smith introduced his amendment by 
saying, “it is indisputable fact that all throughout industry women are 
discriminated against in that just generally speaking they do not get as high 
compensation.”87 Then he read a letter from a “lady” with a “real grievance” 
who complained that the imbalance between the number of men and women 
prevents women from attaining happiness.88 This evoked laughter, and led 
observers to dub the debate “Ladies Day” in the House.89 Representative 
Emmanuel Celler responded to Smith, saying that women were not a minority 
in his household even though he always had the last words, and those words 
were “Yes, dear.”90 The laughter and jocularity subsided as a serious 
discussion ensued.91 
On the floor of the House the debate was not extensive, but all the 
principal arguments for and against a prohibition on sex discrimination were 
thoroughly aired. Its opponents were concerned that the amendment would be 
a threat to protective legislation premised on the view that women “‘were 
marginal participants in labor markets’” and “‘were especially deserving of 
public protection as actual or potential mothers.’”92 The opponents relied 
heavily on the fact that members of the labor and women’s rights communities 
as well as the President’s Commission on the Status of Women were opposed 
to any law that would undermine the special protections of women.93 Peterson, 
 
 82. Id. at 174–75. 
 83. Id. at 175. 
 84. Louis Menand, The Sex Amendment: How women got in on the Civil Rights Act., THE 
NEW YORKER, July 21, 2014, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/07/21/sex-
amendment. 
 85. Osterman, supra note 76, at 412–13. 
 86. Kraditor, supra note 7, at 138-185. 
 87. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213 
(1968). 
 88. Id. at 3213–14. 
 89. Freeman, supra note 41, at 176. 
 90. Osterman, supra note 76, at 412. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1307, 1321 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 93. Id. at 1321. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
74 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI:59 
Deputy Secretary of Labor and head of the Women’s Bureau, acknowledged 
that women experienced discrimination in employment but agreed with the 
conclusion of the President’s Commission that “discrimination based on sex 
. . . involve[d] problems sufficiently different from discrimination based on 
[the] other factors listed to make separate treatment preferable.”94 As she 
described it, it was preferable to have “specific bills for specific ills.”95 
Peterson and other feminists who had fought for protective legislation for 
women consistently opposed the ERA and initially opposed inclusion of sex in 
Title VII for the same reason—because they feared that the principle of equal 
treatment under the law would undermine the few gains women had made.96 
They also thought the EPA had addressed the principal evil plaguing women in 
the workforce and that the Civil Rights Act should not be cluttered up with the 
inclusion of sex.97 The Commission’s Committee on Home and Community 
had stated that care of home and children are the “unique responsibility” of 
women, concluding that “[t[his is not debatable as a philosophy. It is and will 
remain a fact of life.”98 
Opponents also expressed fear that a law prohibiting sex discrimination in 
employment would have an adverse effect on the regulation of traditional sex 
and family roles, and to assist in maintaining proper patriarchal control of the 
family, Representative Robert Griffin proposed an amendment that would bar a 
married women from filing a sex discrimination claim unless her husband were 
unemployed.99 The only woman in the House who spoke against the 
amendment was Edith Green, Democrat of Oregon.100 She said there was ten 
times as much discrimination based on race, as on sex, questioned the motives 
behind the amendment, and worried it would clutter the bill and might 
undermine passage.101 
Proponents of the amendment did not disagree that adding sex to Title VII 
would undermine protective legislation and traditional family roles, rather they 
said that was the whole point.102 Representative Martha Griffiths spoke at 
length about the deleterious effects of protective legislation, saying that these 
laws kept women in low-paying jobs.103 Representative St. George made the 
same argument, emphasizing that limitations on women’s ability to work late 
at night means they are not able to make the higher pay associated with such 
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work.104 Both female representatives said the history of subordination of 
women in the American legal system was not a tradition of which to be 
proud.105 
The vote is what ultimately decided whether sex would be added to Title 
VII.106 Members of Congress, who had listened to Peterson’s presentations for 
two years before passing the EPA in 1963, and who listened to the arguments 
of their female colleagues, were apparently inclined to believe that women 
faced real discrimination in employment; the women in Congress were 
convinced by the derisive laughter of their male colleagues, if nothing else, 
that including sex was both appropriate and necessary.107 As Representative 
Griffiths said, “[I]f there had been any necessity to have pointed out that 
women were a second-class sex, the laughter would have proved it.”108 In the 
end, the amendment passed in the House 168 to 133, and the bill itself passed 
290 to 130.109 
When the bill went to the Senate, President Johnson, Peterson, and various 
women’s groups rallied to support the bill with sex included.110 Since they no 
longer feared that the amendment was a ploy to derail passage of the Civil 
Rights Act, they no longer opposed its inclusion.111 Although Senator Everett 
Dirksen wanted to take sex out of the Act, the NWP continued to advocate for 
it and Margaret Chase Smith, one of only two women in the Senate, supported 
it.112 In the end the Senate passed the bill with sex included, the House adopted 
the Senate’s version after one hour of debate, and President Johnson signed the 
bill the same day, on July 2, 1964.113 Since sex was removed from all the other 
titles of the Civil Rights Act, it seems safe to say that a majority in Congress 
thought discrimination against women in the workplace was a real concern that 
justified legislative action.114 
But it also seems safe to say that few who were considering the wisdom of 
outlawing sex discrimination in 1963-64 could have foreseen where the sex 
amendment would lead. In the first year after enactment, one-third of charges 
filed with the EEOC alleged sex discrimination.115 Title VII was definitely 
born out of the racial tension of the time, but the unexpected inclusion of sex in 
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the statute quickly led women workers and the newly emerging women’s 
movement of the late 1960s to take advantage of the opportunity to pursue 
equality by filing charges with the EEOC and then by pursuing their claims in 
the courts.116 The leadership of the EEOC was unprepared to deal with claims 
of sex discrimination, and had a significant role in fostering the myth that sex 
had been introduced into the statute by accident.117 EEOC leaders said it was a 
“fluke,” “conceived out of wedlock,” and contended that they had a number of 
problems of interpretation because there was no legislative history.118 They 
also stated that sex discrimination does not have “the same moral overtones” as 
race “and there are few women’s protest organizations.”119 An EEOC official 
described the prohibition of sex discrimination as an “orphan” and worried 
about how to apply the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense in 
cases of sex discrimination.120 The defense permits an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of sex if it can prove that sex is a “qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.”121 
EEOC officials suggested the BFOQ defense raises the “bunny” problem, 
meaning that Playboy Clubs might be forced to hire men as Playboy 
bunnies.122 
When the EEOC promulgated its first guidelines on whether weight-lifting 
restrictions are legal under Title VII, at the end of 1965, the agency said it had 
to proceed with caution because it had no legislative history to guide its 
interpretations.123 It stated that it issued guidelines as “an effort to temper the 
bare language of the statute with common sense and a sympathetic 
understanding of the position and needs of women workers.”124 The guidelines 
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stated that weight restrictions will be honored except where the limit is set at 
an unreasonably low level.125 
The EEOC’s dismissive attitude toward the prohibition on sex 
discrimination not only helped to foster the myth that sex was added as a joke, 
it also led directly to the formation of the National Organization for Women 
which petitioned the EEOC to take the provision seriously.126 Representative 
Griffiths spoke on the House floor in 1966 to criticize the EEOC’s use of the 
legislative history as a rationale for its lax enforcement, saying “I reject that 
slur on Congress” and arguing that there was no need for an extensive 
legislative discussion on discrimination against women because the problems 
had been thoroughly discussed for the preceding two years during debates on 
the EPA.127 Although EEOC leaders professed that they were unsure about 
what to do, most scholars see this as a period of massive resistance to 
enforcement by the EEOC.128 One Commissioner said the sex provision “is 
mysterious and difficult to understand and control” but business leaders and 
feminists were demanding that the EEOC take a position on the viability of 
protective legislation as well as the legality of sex-specific classified 
advertising in newspapers. NOW and other feminists succeeded by the end of 
the 1960s in convincing the EEOC to take positions on gender that were as 
aggressive as its early positions on race discrimination.129 Thus, in 1969, the 
EEOC issued guidelines stating that sex-segregated job advertising violated 
Title VII and that pregnancy discrimination constituted discrimination because 
of sex, and it also adopted a strong stance against protective legislation.130 
The courts agreed with the EEOC’s new-found understanding of the scope 
and meaning of discrimination on the basis of sex. In Weeks v. Southern Bell 
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,131 a case involving a weight lifting restriction, the 
court rejected the company’s explanation for its restriction, and held that: 
Title VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and 
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take 
on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the 
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, 
boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that 
women are now to be on equal footing.132 
 
 125. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, supra note 124, at 14,927. 
 126. Osterman, supra note 76, at 419–20, n. 69. 
 127. Osterman, supra note 76, at 420. 
 128. Franklin, supra note 92, at 1333. 
 129. Franklin, supra note 92, at 1338, 1345. 
 130. Franklin, supra note 92, at 1345. 
 131. See generally Weeks v. S. Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232–33, 236 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
 132. Id. at 236. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
78 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI:59 
And in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,133 the court invalidated the 
restrictive state protective legislation that limited women to jobs that did not 
require lifting over twenty-five to thirty pounds, and thus opened up new job 
opportunities for women. The Ninth Circuit cited to the EEOC’s newly 
adopted regulations, noting that the EEOC had taken its position “after 
considerable hesitation” but that the EEOC now believes that state laws 
inconsistent with the objectives of Title VII must be disregarded, and held that 
this interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference.134 So the opponents of 
the ERA and of adding sex to Title VII were correct in predicting this result. 
But the reality was that by that time the earlier protective legislation was out of 
favor and no longer regarded as needed. 
Another consequence of passage of Title VII was that women used 
disparate impact theory successfully to challenge height and weight 
requirements for other jobs traditionally held by men. Under this method of 
proving discrimination, a plaintiff does not have to show that an employer 
intended to discriminate against women, just that a neutral rule or qualification 
standard had the effect of screening out women disproportionately, and the 
standard was not justified by business necessity.135 For example in Dothard v. 
Rawlinson,136 the Court said the minimum height and weight requirements 
used to screen applicants for positions as correctional counselors in the state 
penitentiary system had an unlawful disparate impact on women. The Court 
was persuaded that the height and weight requirements were not job related. 
However, the Court ruled in favor of the Alabama prison system on its other 
asserted defense, and held that it had proved that being a man was a BFOQ for 
the position because sex offenders were scattered throughout the facility and a 
“woman’s ability to maintain order” in such a facility “would be directly 
reduced by her womanhood.”137 
Women’s advocates also used Title VII to seek redress for harassment in 
the workplace and in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,138 the Supreme Court 
held that sexual harassment, if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive, constitutes 
discrimination in working conditions on the basis of sex. It is not intuitively 
obvious that harassment would be seen as a form of discrimination, in that it 
does not necessarily involve a tangible employment action or conduct by a 
company official. But in 1980 the EEOC had published guidelines on sex 
discrimination explaining that harassment creates discriminatory terms and 
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conditions of employment that can be actionable under Title VII,139 and the 
Court deferred to the agency’s expertise in ruling in Vinson’s favor. 
In another significant sexual harassment case, Harris v. Forklift 
Systems,140 the Court clarified the substantive standard for proving actionable 
harassment. The Court held that Title VII is violated when a workplace is 
permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s 
employment and create an abusive working environment.”141 The Court 
expressly noted that a plaintiff does not need to prove that the harassment 
seriously affected her psychological well-being to prevail.142 Subsequently, in 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,143 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,144 
the Court explained the rules for holding an employer liable for the harassment 
perpetrated by subordinate employees, and held that employers will be strictly 
liable if the harassment culminates in a tangible employment action (for 
example, if a supervisor fires an employee who refuses his sexual advances; 
the type of case previously known as “quid pro quo” harassment). But in cases 
of hostile environment harassment, where no tangible actions are taken, the 
Court significantly undermined the likelihood that plaintiffs will obtain relief 
by creating an affirmative defense that makes it easier for employers to avoid 
liability in cases of supervisory harassment. The Court held that an employer 
can avoid liability or damages in supervisor harassment cases if it can prove it 
had an effective sexual harassment policy and procedure in place at the time of 
the harassment, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of those 
procedures.145 Then, in Vance v. Ball State University,146 the Court made such 
cases even more challenging by rejecting the EEOC’s guidance on the point 
and adopting a narrow definition of a supervisory employee for purposes of the 
Faragher/Ellerth rule, holding that an employee is a supervisor for purposes of 
vicarious liability only if he or she is empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions against the victim.147 This result struck Justice 
Ginsburg as such a departure from prior agency principles and from the 
realities of the workplace that she said at the end of her dissenting opinion, 
“The ball is once again in Congress’ court to correct the error into which this 
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Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace 
harassment the Court weakens today.”148 
Litigants also, quite reasonably, argued that discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy constituted sex discrimination. But these arguments were rejected 
by the Supreme Court. 
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
Soon after Title VII was enacted women began to challenge discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy, which many believed was synonymous with sex 
discrimination. The EEOC has maintained since 1972 that employment 
policies or practices that adversely affect female employees because of 
pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions constitute disparate 
treatment based on sex.149 The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with 
that analysis when evaluating a constitutional equal protection claim. In 
Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court in 1974 held that a state law that excluded from 
disability benefits a temporary disability caused by an uncomplicated 
pregnancy did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because such a program 
does not discriminate on the basis of sex, but rather simply “divides potential 
recipients in two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”150 
Women continued to use Title VII to bring challenges to the denial of 
benefits for pregnancy and employer policies that denied them maternity leave, 
and most lower courts held that Geduldig was not applicable to Title VII, 
which the courts thought did prohibit such discrimination. The courts reasoned 
that an employer engaged in disparate treatment on the basis of sex if it treated 
a temporary incapacity due to pregnancy or childbirth less favorably than a 
temporary disability due to any other reason. The Supreme Court disagreed 
with this reasoning. Following its logic in Geduldig, the Court decided in 1976 
in General Electric v. Gilbert that such exclusions from disability plan 
coverage of periods of disability arising from or related to pregnancy are not 
sex-based within the meaning of Title VII and cannot even be challenged 
under a disparate impact theory as neutral practices that have an impact based 
on sex.151 Similarly in 1977, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, the Court held that 
it was not unlawful sex discrimination to exclude pregnancy from a sick leave 
policy, since that exclusion merely constituted a failure to extend to women a 
benefit that men could not and did not receive, although the Court concluded 
that the employer violated Title VII by requiring women to forfeit their 
seniority on return from a leave necessitated by childbirth.152 
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In response to these decisions women’s groups mobilized to seek a 
legislative fix. The attorney who represented Gilbert and the class of women 
who challenged General Electric’s policy, Ruth Weyand, and many other labor 
and civil rights activists, feminists, and women’s organizations, including the 
National Organization for Women and the National Partnership for Women 
and Families, as well as some right-to-life groups, quickly formed a coalition 
called the Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and 
petitioned Congress to amend Title VII to provide that discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy is gender-based discrimination.153 These women were 
incensed that the Court had given this “slap in the face to motherhood.”154 
Congress swiftly responded by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
of 1978. The PDA specifically overruled Gilbert’s interpretation of Title VII 
by amending the statute to say that “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” 
includes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.”155 The PDA contains two separate provisions, each 
guaranteeing a substantive right. The first is the right against being treated 
adversely because of pregnancy; the second is the right to be treated, when 
pregnant and unable to work, the same as other employees who are also unable 
to work due to temporary disability. As Senator Williams, a sponsor of the Act, 
stated: “The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation is to guarantee women the 
basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying 
them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.”156 
The first case under the PDA to reach the Supreme Court involved a claim 
of discrimination against men. In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC,157 the EEOC sued Newport News because its health insurance 
plan (as amended to comply with the PDA) provided coverage for pregnancy-
related conditions for female employees, but provided only limited coverage of 
pregnancy for employees’ wives. The Court focused on the benefits provided 
to the spouses of male and female employees, and noted that “the husbands of 
female employees receive a specified level of hospitalization coverage for all 
conditions; the wives of male employees receive such coverage except for 
 
 153. Nicholas Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal Paths to the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 11 (2009). 
 154. Id. 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). The amendment provides: 
(k) The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work . . . . 
 156. 123 CONG. REC. 29658 (1977). 
 157. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
82 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI:59 
pregnancy-related conditions.”158 This established facial discrimination 
because of sex in the literal sense. The Court relied on EEOC guidelines in 
reaching its conclusions; the first reiterated a principle of antidiscrimination 
law, that an employer is free to provide no benefits, but if it does provide 
benefits, it must do so on a nondiscriminatory basis; and the second 
distinguished between the level of coverage for employees and for dependents, 
stating that under Title VII an employer can choose to cover employees more 
fully than dependents, but must cover pregnancy-related conditions of spouses 
at the same level as all other conditions of spouses, male or female.159 
The second PDA case to reach the Supreme Court embodied the central 
tactical and philosophical controversy among advocates of women’s rights that 
remains alive today: that of equal versus special treatment for pregnancy. In 
California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, the plaintiff 
challenged her employer’s refusal to reinstate her in her job when she returned 
from a four-month “pregnancy disability leave” mandated by state law.160 The 
state enforcement agency interpreted the leave statute as including a right to 
post-leave reinstatement.161 The employer argued the state law was preempted 
by the PDA, and could not stand because it opened employers to charges of 
reverse discrimination under Title VII by requiring preferential treatment for 
pregnant women.162 Feminists who embraced the equal treatment approach to 
pregnancy argued the PDA literally mandates equal treatment, and that the 
employer could achieve the equal treatment required by Title VII without 
violating state law if it extended the same leave and reinstatement rights to 
non-pregnant employees. Feminists who advocated special treatment of 
pregnancy argued that the special characteristics of pregnancy and the realities 
it created for women required special accommodations for working women so 
that they would not experience job setbacks as a result of becoming parents. 
Thus, they argued that the state law was compatible with Title VII’s goal of 
equal employment opportunity for women. The Supreme Court concluded that 
the PDA established a floor, not a ceiling, on pregnancy benefits, and that the 
state statute and the PDA shared the goal of promoting equal employment 
opportunity.163 The majority held that the special leave provided by the 
California statute was “narrowly drawn” and therefore did not represent a 
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return to archaic protective legislation that had been based on stereotypical 
notions about the abilities of pregnant workers.164 
While Title VII mandates equal treatment of men and women, it creates a 
limited exception to the prohibition on discrimination, as mentioned earlier in 
discussing Dothard v. Rawlinson. If sex is a BFOQ for a job, an employer may 
discriminate on the basis of sex. The BFOQ defense requires a showing that 
being of one sex is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
particular business or enterprise. In International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., the third PDA case to reach the Supreme Court, the Court 
considered the BFOQ exception in the context of a pregnancy case.165 Johnson 
Controls manufactured batteries and prohibited all fertile women from jobs 
involving lead exposure because that exposure was arguably harmful to 
developing fetuses.166 The company defended this “fetal protection” policy on 
the basis of moral and ethical concerns for the next generation, and out of 
concern for potential tort liability if children of mothers who had been exposed 
to lead were born with defects.167 The Supreme Court justices all agreed the 
policy excluding women was discriminatory, the question was whether it was 
justified as a BFOQ. The Court concluded the policy obviously discriminated 
on the basis of sex and pregnancy and that it could not be saved by the BFOQ 
defense because there was no suggestion that potentially or actually pregnant 
women were less capable of making batteries than nonpregnant employees.168 
Finally, in Young v. United Parcel Services, Inc., the Court considered a 
much more challenging issue of pregnancy discrimination—whether 
employers are required to accommodate pregnant women who have temporary 
medical restrictions by allowing them to do “light duty” work if such work is 
available to others who have temporary disabilities.169 UPS accommodated 
three classes of employees by allowing them to take light duty status if they 
had on-the-job injuries, if they had disabilities within the meaning of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and if they were unable to drive because of 
license restrictions, but it did not allow this accommodation to Peggy Young 
when her midwife advised her not to lift over 20 pounds.170 The Court was not 
persuaded by the EEOC’s position that the PDA’s second clause requires such 
an accommodation whenever an employer has a policy that provides the 
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accommodation to others similar in their inability to work, regardless of the 
reason they are unable to work.171 The Court adopted a narrower rule that 
where a pregnant plaintiff shows that others similar to her were 
accommodated, the burden shifts to the employer to justify its reasons for the 
refusal to accommodate her, and its reason must be something more than that it 
would be more expensive or less convenient to accommodate pregnant 
women.172 If the employer explains its reasons, the plaintiff then may 
challenge it as a pretext by showing that the employer’s “policies impose a 
significant burden on pregnant workers” and the employer’s reasons are “not 
sufficiently strong to justify the burden.”173 Essentially, the Court held that 
UPS might have accommodated too many other workers to be able to meet its 
burden of proving a valid reason for excluding pregnant workers. 
The arguments in the Young case are reminiscent of the divide between 
earlier feminists who emphasized arguments based in claims of equality and 
those whose arguments were based in claims of difference and the need for 
special treatment. Although militant feminists like Alice Paul and other 
supporters of the ERA thought protective legislation was injurious to women 
and that the rationale for it ran counter to demands for equal treatment under 
the law, many of those differences seemed muted in 2016. The needs of 
pregnant workers have not really changed in the two centuries women have 
been working outside the home, but the willingness of courts to recognize and 
respect those needs without indulging in romantic paternalism has undergone 
substantial change, thanks to the heroic efforts of women willing to sue to 
advance women’s rights to fair and equal treatment, and to the readiness of the 
enforcement agencies and members of Congress to step up when necessary. 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, like Title VII itself and the Equal Pay 
Act, provides a microcosmic view of our constitutional system in operation, 
revealing the dynamic interplay of congressional legislative enactments, 
enforcement agency interpretations, and judicial construction of those 
enactments as the law is shaped and reshaped in response to changing 
circumstances. The legislative processes were radically different with the three 
statutes discussed here, in that the EPA was a carefully constructed enactment 
designed in response to a Presidential Commission’s recommendation passed 
after two years of hearings and debates; the Title VII sex amendment added a 
single word to the statute, was discussed for two hours on the House floor, but 
was inserted at the behest of a determined and insistent small group who 
fought for it for over 40 years in one form or another; and the PDA was a 
specifically targeted statute designed to “overrule” a decision of the Court that 
was viewed as wrongheaded by a large and diverse group of activists who 
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formed an organized effort to get what was needed with surgical precision. The 
success of these statutes in transforming the lives of working women cannot be 
overstated, but what strikes me as really remarkable is that the intellectual and 
emotional arguments advanced by litigants and activists in the last 53 years 
mirror or echo the arguments organized feminists first advanced in the early 
19th century. And, there is still work to be done. 
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